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required that the defendant make the motion to add the omitted
party even if the order directing the party to be added was futile
in that the absent party was clearly not subject to the jurisdiction
of the court and had refused to appear voluntarily.223
Since the avowed intent of the Revisers was the avoidance
of delay caused by multiplicity of motions, one might assume
that the CPLR would change this procedure, and allow a motion
to dismiss for nonjoinder in such instance to be made immediately.
There is no specific provision in the CPLR which makes a
motion for joinder of the indispensable party a condition precedent
to a rule 3211 (a) (10) motion to dismiss on grounds of non-
joinder.2 24  It is apparent that a rule 3211(a) (10) motion could
be conditionally granted.2 25 The court in such an order would
allow a reasonable time for the absent party to be joined, after
which time the order would become absolute (and the action would
be dismissed) unless an extension was granted.
If it appears at the very outset, however, that the action
cannot continue without the party; that such party is not subject
to the jurisdiction of the court; and that he has refused to appear
voluntarily, the court should order immediate dismissal.
The court in the instant case interpreted the CPLR as re-
taining the dual-motion procedure of the CPA. Such motion
practice results in unnecessary delay. The decision appears to
give the relevant CPLR provisions a construction they were not
intended to have.226 The dual-motion procedure should not be
required in circumstances where it serves no useful purpose.
Motion to Dismiss for Want of Prosecution
Rule 3216 of the CPLR, which provides for the dismissal
of a complaint for failure to prosecute an action, has become
a strong source of controversy recently. The storm center is
the first department case of Sortino v. Fisher,227 which will be
treated at length shortly.
Where the plaintiff has unreasonably delayed in pressing his
claim to adjudication, the court, on its own initiative or upon
motion, may dismiss the complaint. 228 No particular period of
delay is required; if it is substantial on the facts of the case it is
223 Carruthers v. Jack Waite Mining Co., 306 N.Y. 136, 116 N.E.2d 286
(1953).224 See CPLR § 1001(b).
225 See 2 WEINSTEIN, KORN & MILLER, NEW YoiRK CIVIL PRACTICE 1[ 1003.05
(1964).
226 See Ibid.; WACHTELL, NEW YORK PRACTICE UNDER THE CPLR
80 (1963); but see 7B McKiNEY'S CPLR R. 3211, commentary 324-25.
22720 App. Div. 2d 25, 245 N.Y.S.2d 186 (1st Dep't 1963).
228 CPLR R. 3216.
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sufficient to permit a rule 3216 motion to dismiss.2 2 9  Generally,
in order to avoid such dismissal it is incumbent upon the plaintiff
to show (1) a valid excuse for the delay, and (2) that his cause
of action has merit. 230  In enacting rule 3216 the Legislature
intended to retain the flexibility of prior practice under the CPA.
Hence, a court still has the discretionary power to deal adequately
with the varied situations that might constitute neglect in pros-
ecution.231  The new rule is practically identical to Section 181
of the CPA, with the one exception that it allows a court to
dismiss on its own initiative (which had been the practice under
prior case law).232 It should be noted that at the time of this
writing an amendment of rule 3216 was passed by the Legislature
and is now on the Governor's desk awaiting action. If the amend-
ment is approved by the Governor, the Appendix following this
article will treat it. The amendment provides that, before a
motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute can be granted, the
defendant must serve upon the plaintiff, at least forty-five days
prior to the making of his motion, a notice requiring the plaintiff
to proceed in the action by filing and serving a note of issue.
Thereafter, if the plaintiff files and serves such note of issue within
the forty-five day period, and the defendant nonetheless makes the
motion, the court must deny it.
Whether the amendment is signed by the Governor or not,
the following discussion will remain relevant and the cases on
rule 3216 will remain applicable. If the amendment is approved,
the cases will still provide the criteria governing disposition of a
rule 3216 motion (as where such a motion is made because plain-
tiff fails to take the steps that would avoid the motion under the
amendment).
Sortino v. Fisher233 involved the usual negligence action.
Plaintiff commenced the action in November 1960 and issue was
joined a month later. Defendant moved to dismiss for failure
to prosecute in August 1962. The last activity of the plaintiff
229 See, e.g., White v. Good Operating Corp., 19 App. Div. 2d 802, 243
N.Y.S.2d 260 (1st Dep't 1963) (73 months delay in negligence action);
Noble v. Hayakawa, 16 App. Div. 2d 616, 225 N.Y.S.2d 985 (1st Dep't
1962) (20 months delay in action on note).23oKeating v. Smith, 20 App. Div. 2d 141, 245 N.Y.S.2d 909 (2d Dep't
1963); Powell v. Becker Truck Renting Corp., 20 App. Div. 2d 573, 245
N.Y.S.2d 910 (2d Dep't 1963); Brown v. Prezebowski, 14 App. Div. 2d
812, 221 N.Y.S.2d 256 (2d Dep't 1961).2 3 1 FIRST REP. 101-03; see 1960 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 20, FOURT= PRE-
LIifINARY REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMM=itEE ON PRACTiCE AND PROCEDURE
194 [hereinafter cited as FOURTH REP.].
232Frederick v. Oliver & Burr, 154 App. Div. 346, 139 N.Y. Supp. 320
(3d Dep't 1912); Sulzer v. Fontheim, 170 Misc. 552, 10 N.Y.S.2d 527
(Sup. Ct 1939).
23320 App. Div. 2d 25, 245 N.Y.S.2d 186 (1st Dep't 1963).
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prior to defendant's motion was in March 1962, when the exam-
ination before trial was completed. The appellate division reversed
the order of the lower court (which denied the motion) and
held that, although the delay since the last step in the instant
case was only five months, it was two and one-half years since
joinder of issue. The delay was held substantial and unreasonable.
Plaintiff's excuse, viz., that she was waiting for court reorganization
to take effect on September 1, 1962 so that the case could 'be
transferred to the civil court, was held insufficient, as were her
affidavits showing the merits of her cause of action, which con-
tained nothing but fiearsay reference to the facts.
The court's dismissal in Sortino, though not on the merits
(rule 3216 specifically provides that the dismissal is not on the
merits unless the court so indicates) is in effect with prejudice,
since the statute of limitations on the tort has generally expired
when the motion is made (the defendant withholds the motion
until its expiration) and the plaintiff is thereby barred from bring-
ing a new suit on the same cause of action.234
As already mentioned, the plaintiff must offer an excuse for
his delay. The court in Sortino indicates that any "Law Office
Failures," that is, excuses which merely shift the blame for delay
from the plaintiff to his lawyer or to other associated counsel, will
be rejected. 235  Thus, excuses based on negligence and mistakes
of the plaintiffs' lawyers are inadequate. 236  Herman Glaser, the
president of the New York State Association of Trial Lawyers,
in an editorial criticizing the court's decision in Sortino, disagrees
with this view and takes the position that the court is being
unrealistic in not taking into account the problems of the practicing
lawyer and his overburdened schedule.2 3 7
The court, in Sortino, rejects also any excuse based on the
defendant's acquiescence in plaintiff's neglect to proceed, main-
taining that the duty to prosecute the action rests solely on the
plaintiff.238  However, in Carbonel v. Ocasio,239 the court took a
234 DeMarco v. Boqhossian, 37 Misc. 2d 701, 236 N.Y.S.2d 585 (Westchester
County Ct. 1962); Berman v. Esposito, 35 Misc. 2d 59, 228 N.Y.S.2d 18
(Nassau County Dist. Ct. 1962).
235 Sortino v. Fisher, 20 App. Div. 2d 25, 29, 245 N.Y.S.2d 186, 192 (1st
Dep't 1963).236 Berger v. Colrick, 20 App. Div. 2d 639, 246 N.Y.S.2d 366 (2d Dep't
1964); Rodriguez v. Martinez, 20 App. Div. 2d 632, 246 N.Y.S.2d 267 (1st
Dep't 1964); Wilson v. Whitehall Hotel Corp., 20 App. Div. 2d 525, 245
N.Y.S.2d 204 (1st Dep't 1963); Maloney v. Springfield Dev. Co., 20 App.
Div. 2d 526, 245 N.Y.S.2d 209 (1st Dep't 1963); Valentin v. Ina Holding
Corp., 20 App. Div. 2d 525, 245 N.Y.S.2d 206 (1st Dep't 1963).
237 151 N.Y.L.J., Feb. 6, 1964, p. 4, col. 1.
238 Sortino v. Fisher, .spra note 235, at 30, 245 N.Y.S.2d at 193.
23941 Misc. 2d 33, 245 N.Y.S.2d 670 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 19 App. Div. 2d
799, 243 N.Y.S.2d 421 (2d Dep't 1963).
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contrary view, stating that if the defendant deliberately acquiesces
in the plaintiff's delay until the statute of limitations has expired
and then moves for dismissal, such conduct should not be rewarded
by granting his motion. The fact that the Sortino decision allows
the defendant to use rule 3216 in this manner, has evoked much
criticism.2 40  Furthermore, Sortino says, "the running of the statute
of limitations should re-enforce the view that the action should
be dismissed," 241 in that the statute of limitations indicates the
legislative policy as to when claims have become too stale to be
litigated. On the other hand, Carbonel indicates that the expira-
tion of the statute should act as an additional factor against ordering
dismissal, because the granting of the motion will deprive the
plaintiff "of her day in court." 
242
Mr. Glaser feels that the sole test for granting a motion to
dismiss under rule 3216 should be whether prejudice resulted
to the defendant because of the delay.2 43 The cases often indicate
that once the plaintiff has neglected to proceed for an unreasonable
length of time he can not excuse his neglect by showing that the
defendant has not been substantially prejudiced.2 44
It would appear that what the courts will accept as cir-
cumstances excusing a delay are occurrences beyond the plaintiff's
control, such as personal catastrophes which make it impossible
for the plaintiff to continue the suit.2 45  Of course the fact that
settlement negotiations are being conducted or other pretrial
activity is in progress may excuse a delay in the action, but the
excuse ends a short time after the last communication.2 4
In order to avoid dismissal for an unreasonable delay,
plaintiff has the additional requirement of showing that his cause
of action has merit. In theory, if the plaintiff has a meritorious
claim, he will actively prosecute it, but once he delays in prosecuting
his claim it becomes suspect as to its merits.247  In order to fulfill
this requirement. plaintiff must submit an affidavit of merits which
contains evidentiary statements under oath by one with knowledge
240 Supra note 236.
241 Sortino v. Fisher, supra note 235, at 30, 245 N.Y.S.2d at 193.
242 Carbonel v. Ocasio, 41 Misc. 2d 33, 34, 245 N.Y.S.2d 670 (Sup. Ct.
1963).
243 Supra note 236.
244Reilly v. Mirailh, 20 App. Div. 2d 526, 245 N.Y.S.2d 207 (1st Dep't
1963); Garcia v. Sentry Norden Oil & Heating Co., 18 App. Div. 2d 789,
236 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1st Dep't 1963); but see Zeiger v. Kew Towers, Inc.,
8 App. Div. 2d 827, 190 N.Y.S.2d 93 (2d Dep't 1959); Bull v. Westchester
County, 4 App. Div. 2d 690, 164 N.Y.S.2d 181 (2d Dep't 1957). Note that
the proposed amendment of rule 3216 expressly provides wht the plaintiff
must show to avoid dismissal and makes no mention of prejudice to
defendant.
245 Sortino v. Fisher, supra note 235, at 31, 245 N.Y.S.2d at 194.
246Id. at 29, 245 N.Y.S.2d at 192.247 Id. at 31, 245 N.Y.S.2d. at 194.
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of the facts.248  As pointed out in Sortino, hearsay reference to
the facts is insufficient. However, even though the plaintiff
establishes that his claim has great merit, it does not mean that
he has avoided dismissal. On the contrary, even an action of
great merit may be forfeited by a prolonged delay.2 49
The many recent cases granting motions to dismiss indicate
the strict attitude the courts exhibit to any delay in the prosecution
of an action. The harsh results of dismissal are not apparent
from these decisions since they usually do not mention whether
the applicable statute of limitations has expired (which would
bar the plaintiff from bringing another suit on the same 'cause
of action).
Although a prime aim of the CPLR is to avoid delay and
secure the speedy disposition of litigation, it is also important that
all litigants have their day in court. If a defendant to succeed
on the motion were required to show prejudice to his position
even though the plaintiff's delay be prolonged, such a requirement
would work effectively in insuring that both these considerations
are met.
NEW YORK CITY CIVIL COURT ACT
Summons Must Be Served With Either Formal
Complaint or Indorsement
Plaintiff commenced his action in the New York City Civil
Court by service upon the defendant of a summons without
either a formal complaint or an indorsement on the summons.
Defendant moved to dismiss the summons and vacate service
on the ground that the summons did not contain the indorsement
required by Section 902(a) (1) of the Civil Court Act.2 50 The
court held that since neither a formal complaint nor an informal
complaint by way of indorsement accompanied the summons, it
was void and, hence, could not be cured by amendment.2 5 1  It
therefore dismissed the action.
248 Sortino v. Fisher, supra note 235, at 32, 245 N.Y.S.2d at 194; accord,
Powell v. Becker Truck Renting Corp., 20 App. Div. 2d 573, 245 N.Y.S.2d
910 (2d Dep't 1963); Milligan v. Hycel Realty Corp., 20 App. Div. 2d 527,
245 N.Y.S.2d 210 (1st Dep't 1963); Keating v. Smith, 20 App. Div. 2d
141, 245 N.Y.S.2d 909 (2d. Dep't 1963).
249Hoffman v. Cafanella, 20 App. Div. 2d 524, 245 N.Y.S.2d 203 (1st
Dep't 1963).
250 CCA § 902(a) (1): "All pleadings shall be formal pleadings, as in
supreme court practice, except that: (1) If the plaintiff's cause of action
is for money only and the summons is served by personal delivery to the
defendant within the city of New York, the cause of action may be set forth
by indorsement upon the summons."
251 Paskus, Gordon & Hyman v. Peck, 246 N.Y.S.2d 874 (N.Y. City Civ.
Ct. 1964).
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